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ABSTRACT
In recent years, the strengthening in Turkish constitutional
culture of the rule of law and pluralism appeared as a further
breach of the Kemalist ideology of “sacralization” of the State.
Nevertheless, the principle of statehood, characterizing the
Republic of Turkey since its creation in 1923 and now affirmed in
art. 1 of the Constitution still influences Turkish institutions. With
regard to judicial system, while Euro-driven reforms and the
application of the conditionality principle led to its modernization,
the Constitution sketches an organization based on both
* Researcher and Teaching Assistant in Comparative Constitutional Law,
Faculty of Political Science, University of Rome La Sapienza, Italy; PhD in
“Theory of the State and Comparative Political Institution,” University of Rome
La Sapienza.
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institutional dependence and corporatism. These features are
reflected also in judicial education, notwithstanding the
establishment of a judicial academy in 2003 and the reform of
training catalogues.
Referring to legal and political science literature, as well as
to documents and reports of the Council of Europe and of the
European Union, this paper examines through the lens of training
policies the evolution of Turkish judicial culture in relation to
independence and pluralism, sketching a first hypothesis on the
effectiveness of judicial training reforms in the perspective of
European enlargement. Taking into account three typical elements
of any judicial training system—institutions, contents and
methods—it highlights the difficulties encountered in reforming
judicial training. In particular, it argues that the resistance to open
up the judicial elite to social pluralism in order to allow the
judiciary to act as an interface with civil society is due to the
peculiarities of the Turkish socio-political system (i.e. a nonhomogeneous society and the need of “lay” guardians of the
Republic). As a consequence, European influence is still limited to
the introduction of specific training catalogues, such as human
rights and EU law, but (still) do not really affect the institutional
framework, nor adapts judicial training contents and methods to
social and political pluralism.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper focuses on the changes in the Turkish judicial
training system in the context of the European convergence, which
has also involved other major legal reforms or projects such as the
harmonization packages adopted between 2002 and 2004 and the
Judicial Reform Strategy Action Plan launched by the Turkish
Government in 2009. The recent evolution of Turkish judicial
training is strictly related to the Europeanization of the national
legal system since the Helsinki European Council held in
December 1999, recognizing Turkey as an EU candidate country.
Thus, a joint programme between the Council of Europe and the
European Union on “Modernization of the Judiciary and Penal
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Reform” has been implemented from 2004 to 2007. 1 Among its
specific objectives, the programme included the “Training of
judicial staff strengthened according to European standards and
practices.” Furthermore, Turkish judges and prosecutors
participated in specific programmes aimed at providing training in
sensitive areas. In this paper, I investigate the relation between
changes in judicial training and the judicial culture, 2 arguing that
the Turkish-European convergence in the field of judicial training
is generating changes in specific areas of legal knowledge and
allowing a transnational diffusion of rules, but does not deeply
affect the judicial mentality nor involve the contaminations of
judicial cultures.
For this purpose, I will briefly outline some distinctive
features of the Turkish judiciary, and then analyze closer the
judicial training system. As a preliminary remark, it is necessary to
stress that I limit my discussion to the ordinary courts and judges,
without considering administrative courts, military courts and the
Constitutional Court. However, these different judicial branches
are partly interconnected and are characterized by a partially
common training.
II. DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE TURKISH JUDICIARY
The Turkish constitutional system is founded on Kemalism,
as ideology marked by the unity of the State. As a consequence,
Turkish constitutionalism is rooted in the (partial) opposition
between government (hükümet) and State (devlet), that is between
institutions endowed with representative legitimization—Grand
National Assembly in primis—and State structures and elites—
1. ALFRED E. KELLERMANN ET AL., THE IMPACT OF EU ACCESSION ON THE
LEGAL ORDERS OF NEW EU MEMBER STATES AND (PRE-)CANDIDATE
COUNTRIES: HOPES AND FEARS 215 (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2006).
2. Judicial culture is intended here as legal and political culture of judges
and prosecutors. I refer to the definition given by Tamara Capeta of legal culture
as “the prevailing opinion in a society on the purpose of the law and the role of
different institutions within the legal order” in relation to judges and
prosecutors. Tamara Capeta, Courts and Legal Culture and EU Enlargement, 1
CROATIAN Y.B. OF EUR. L. AND POL’Y 10 (University of Zagreb, 2005). Political
culture is the general political principles to which judges refer as well as the
opinion on the relations between political institutions.
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among which the judicial body and mainly its hierarchy have a
relevant place—led by the military and playing the role of
“guardians” of the Republic. Three distinctive features of the
Turkish judiciary are strictly connected with the inclusion of the
judiciary among the State elites. The first is the centrality of the
judiciary within the legal and the constitutional system (i). The
second is its political insulation and corporatism (ii). The third,
which has a substantive character, pertains to the specific legal and
political cultures marking the judiciary (iii). On the basis of these
three features, the Turkish politico-legal system outlines a “strong”
and highly hierarchical judiciary, as a result of an historical
hybridism blending a traditionally relevant judicial role in the legal
and the constitutional system and a French-derived judicial
organization, characterized by hierarchy and corporatism. In this
framework, “statist” ideology is a crucial factor in shaping the
Turkish judiciary.
A. Centrality of the Judiciary
The importance of the Turkish judiciary, which is the result
of a gradual evolution and, in a measure, of a certain “casualness”
on which any legal system is often grounded, can be pointed out
from different perspectives. With regard to the legal tradition, the
Turkish legal system stems from Western continental legal systems
founded on the predominance of statutory law and codification,
since the adoption of the Swiss civil code and the Italian criminal
code, while in the administrative field the French influence has
prevailed; 3 in this context, the hierarchy of the sources of law lies
in the civil law tradition. However, the Turkish civil code includes
an “important revolutionary principle,” drawn from the Swiss civil
code, which expressly authorizes the judge to act as a law-maker
when any interpretative method is ineffective. 4 On this basis,
Turkish judges expressed a certain judicial activism, complying
with the model of the “interstitial legislator,” where judicial

3. TUGRUL ANSAY & DON WALLACE, INTRODUCTION TO TURKISH LAW 9
(5th ed., Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2005).
4. Id.
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activity does not differ qualitatively from that of the legislator. 5
Secondly, the Turkish legal system accepts exceptionally the
principle of stare decisis, binding lower courts as well as each
single division of the Supreme Court of Appeals, whereas the
decision is taken by the General Assembly of the Court. 6
From a constitutional point of view, the centrality of the
judiciary is rooted in the Constitution of 1961 and then renewed to
some extent by the Constitution of 1982. While the first establishes
the principle of the rule of law, formally considering the judiciary
as a guardian of the Republic, the second assigns the judiciary an
active role, aimed at regulating “the political arena and [at]
facilitat[ing] the transformation of the society through state
action.” 7 This particular position of the judiciary, which is typical
in authoritarian military regimes, 8 can be also explained through
the will of “political elites whose hegemonic interests are
threatened by popular politicians to delegate some of their power
to constitutionally empowered judicial institutions in order to
preserve their privileges.” 9 However, since 1982, this position is
closely linked with the will of the military elite to carry out a
programme of transformation of society, and the proper role of the
judiciary is “not to oppose the executive but to support it in the
performance of its constitutional duties.” 10

5. JOHN BELL, POLICY ARGUMENTS IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS 17 (Oxford
University Press, 1983). Meaningfully, the Constitution of 1961, which
introduces the incidental review, also allows the courts to directly interpret the
Constitution in the absence of a decision of the Constitutional court within three
months from its submission, CONSTITUTION OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC Art. 151.
The 1982 Constitution bans this practice, establishing that the lower courts have
to decide in conformity with the existing interpretation.
6. See supra text accompanying note 3.
7. Hootan Shambayati & Esen Kirdis, In Pursuit of “Contemporary
Civilization:” Judicial Empowerment in Turkey, 62 POL. RES. Q. 767 (2009). A
different spirit animates art. 8 of the Constitution of 1924: “The judicial power is
exercised in the name of the Assembly by independent tribunals constituted in
accordance with the law.” Edward M. Earle, The New Constitution of Turkey, 40
POL. SCI. Q. 73-100 (1925).
8. See RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN
REGIMES (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., Cambridge University Press,
2008).
9. G. M. Teczür, Judicial Activism in Perilous Times: The Turkish Case, 2
L. & SOC’Y REV. 245, 309 (2009).
10. Shambayati & Kirdiş, supra note 7, at 775.
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B. Political Insulation, Corporatism, Hierarchy
At this stage the issue of the specific legal and political
culture of Turkish judges arises. However, I want first to briefly
point out the second distinctive feature—or bulk of features—
consisting of the political insulation, corporatism and
“hierarchization” of the judiciary. Indeed, insulation and
corporatism are the core of the notion of the independence of
courts in Turkish constitutionalism.
Insulation is first of all declined in terms of neutralization
of the judicial function, which permeates several constitutional
provisions: as examples, I can recall the prohibition for judges and
prosecutors of becoming members of political parties (art. 68, fifth
paragraph); the conformity of the judicial activity to the
Constitution and the law (art. 138, first paragraph); the prohibition
of any direct or indirect influence on the exercise of the judicial
function (art. 138, second and third paragraphs); the possibility of
conducting all or part of the hearings in closed session “in cases
where absolutely required for reasons of public morality or public
security” (art. 141, first paragraph); and the election of the
members of the Supreme Court of Appeals by secret ballot (art.
154, second paragraph). 11 On the other hand, corporatism and
“hierarchization” shape the institutional organization and the status
of judges and prosecutors, which is built on the French-derived
bureaucratic organization. 12
The connection with the extrajudicial—political—sphere is
realized through the President of the Republic and the Ministry of
Justice, while the recently adopted constitutional reform of the
Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), which
encountered the opposition of the higher judges, has broadened the
links with external institutions. Therefore, the former appoints the
11. Meaningfully, the Turkish legal system does not envisage the jury, as a
means to “introduce” society within the judicial system, and has excluded until
recent times the possibility for judges and prosecutors to create judicial
associations.
12. CARLO GUARNIERI & PATRIZIA PEDERZOLI., THE POWER OF JUDGES: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COURTS AND DEMOCRACY (Cheryl A. Thomas ed.,
Oxford University Press, 2002). The Turkish judicial organization is based on
four different ranks, while the career processes are broadly determined by
magistrates’ superiors.
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Chief Public Prosecutor and the Deputy Chief Public Prosecutor
among the members of the Supreme Court of Appeals (art. 154,
first paragraph); 13 the Ministry of Justice, to which judges and
public prosecutors are attached “where their administrative
functions are concerned” (art. 140, sixth paragraph), authorizes
inquiries and investigations by judiciary inspectors or senior judges
or prosecutors (art. 144) and presides over the Supreme Council of
Judges and Prosecutors (art. 159, second paragraph). 14
C. Judicial Culture
The third feature is the legal and political cultures of
Turkish judges, bringing up three points. The first relates to the
guardianship role carried on by the judiciary as a part of a group of
elites 15 and to the above-mentioned importance of the judiciary
within the Constitution of 1961 and 1982. These characteristics are
linked to the safeguard (either active or passive) of the integrity of
the Kemalist Republic against any religious, ethnic or social
enemy. In this regard, it is common to speak in terms of “strategic
alliance between the judiciary and the military,” 16 while some
authors consider that “the case of Turkey offers a fascinating study
of a judiciary used in the service of the executive [military]
branch.” 17 The existence of a so-called Republican Alliance
including—besides the military and the judiciary—other sectors of
the society and the State such as the Universities and the
Republican People’s Party (CHP) is generally accepted, 18 even
though this picture is not completely sharp, as there have been
13. Before the above-mentioned reform, the President of the Republic also
appointed the five members of the HSYK, on the basis of lists established by the
Supreme Court of Appeals and the Council of State.
14. Other non-constitutional provisions give the Ministry of Justice an
important influence on the judiciary. As an example, a ministerial commission
controls the admission to the Justice Academy through an oral exam.
15. This principle “entails that a group of elites governs by reason of its
unique knowledge, wisdom, and virtue.” Teczür, supra note 9, at 307.
16. Id. at 309.
17. Lisa Hiblink & Patricia J. Woods, Comparative Sources of Judicial
Empowerment, 62 POL. RES. Q. 745, 748 (2009).
18. Ceren Belge, Friends of the Court: The Republican Alliance and
Selective Activism of the Constitutional Court of Turkey, 40 L. & SOC’Y REV.
653, 691 (2006).
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divergences to some extent between the military and the judiciary
during the 1960’s and 70’s. 19
The second point is the specific “statist” ideology of the
judiciary, as can be inferred both from the jurisprudence of the last
decade in some sensitive areas, such as freedom of expression and
freedom of association or in cases involving members of the
military, and from the surveys conducted on judicial culture. 20
Case law analysis and studies on judicial culture show that judicial
ideology is grounded on the defense of state interests (secularism,
integrity of the state, etc.), rather than on the inclusion of social
and political pluralism. Actually, a certain opening-up can be
found in courts’ decisions relating to human rights, showing a
fracture between sections of the lower judiciary and the high
judiciary. 21 In this regard, the Şemdinli case is exemplar. 22
Nevertheless, this opening-up does not change the general
tendencies, 23 and it has been further observed that “the nature of
19. Shambayati & Kirdis, supra note 7, at 773.
20. Daniella Kuzmanovic, Finally Insights into the Judicial Culture in
Turkey, available at http://cuminet.blogs.ku.dk (Last visited October 24, 2011)
(referring to two in-depth studies published in May 2009 by the Turkish
Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)).
21. Tezcür holds that:
this [jurisprudence] is rather a collective expression of
professional commitments and ethics of the judges and
prosecutors. Since the 1980s, the state security forces executed
people under the pretext of war on terror and were acquitted in
the courts. This generated a trauma within the judiciary. Now
the judges are claiming, ‘Do not execute people on behalf of
the state and demand our complicity. This time, we will not
comply.’
Tezcür, supra note 9, at 328.
22. I refer to the bombing of a Kurdish bookshop in November 2005 by
noncommissioned officers of the army and an ex-PKK militant working for the
army, who were carrying out one of their ‘‘routine’’ counterinsurgency
operations. The accused were convicted by the Criminal Court of Van, but the
Supreme Court of Appeals revoked the verdict and transferred the case to a
military court. Id. at 318.
23. In 2005, the European Commission observed:
There are signs that the judiciary is increasingly integrating
the new provisions. Several court judgments have been issued
suggesting a positive development in areas such as freedom of
expression, freedom of religion, and the fight against torture
and ill-treatment and honour crimes. This trend also applies to
the decisions of the Council of State. On the other hand, courts
have issued judgments in the opposite direction in the area of
freedom of expression, including against journalists.
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the alliance between the TSK [Army] and the higher courts became
more pronounced after the Justice and Development Party . . .
came to power in 2002.” 24
Thirdly, consistently with the adherence of Turkish judge
to the model of the interstitial legislator, judicial discretion tends to
be very broad in order to implement the Kemalist principles,
thanks also to constitutional and legal provisions. 25 The broad
attitude of the Constitutional Court in defining, for example in
relation to the Kurdish issue, the boundaries between what is
cultural (i.e. nonpolitical) and what is political 26 can be extended to

European Comm’n, Turkey 2005 Progress Report 17, Sept. 11, 2005, available
at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/43956b6d4.html
(Last
visited
November 24, 2011). In an advisory report on the functioning of Turkish
judicial system, it has been noted that, “of course, it is one thing for judges and
public prosecutors to say that they apply the ECHR in their decisions and for
them to cite a selection of their judgments by way of example but that does not
necessarily reflect the general situation or mean that the predominant mentality
of the judiciary has changed.” European Comm’n, The Functioning of the
Judicial System in the Republic of Turkey: Report of an Advisory Visit 132, July
1119, 2004 (prepared by Paul Richmond & Kjell Björnberg); see also European
Comm’n, The Functioning of the Judicial System in the Republic of Turkey:
Report of an Advisory Visit, Sept. 29–Oct. 10, 2003 (prepared by Paul Richmond
& Kjell Björnberg).
24. Tezcür, supra note 9, at 309 (observing that changes in lower court’s
jurisprudence can be the result of the influence of a plurality of actors—
government, public opinion, and civil organizations—rather than of a more
supportive attitude towards human rights).
25. Even if the 2001 constitutional changes limited the grounds of
admissibility of the limitation of fundamental rights and freedoms, by
eliminating a series of general clauses included in article 13 (“public order,”
“general peace,” “public interest,” “public morality,” etc.), and introduced the
principle of proportionality, such clauses reappeared in other articles concerning
specific rights and freedoms (for example, art. 22 on freedom of
communication) and judges have the last word in evaluating proportionality.
26. Shambayati & Kirdiş, supra note 7, at 776. It is worth noting that even
judges and prosecutors who question the traditional pro-military predominance
use the same political arguments. Thus, in relation to the Şemdinli incident, the
prosecutor, indicting the trio who bombed the bookstore on charges of
disrupting the unity of the state and undermining the integrity of the country
(Article 302 of the Turkish Penal Code), made reference to political arguments,
such as the fact that “the employment of illegal means in the war on terror
undercut public confidence in the state and contributed to the goals of the PKK
by undermining state authority, creating disorder, and crystallizing divisive
ethnic identities,” or that, considering the conflict between elected politicians
and appointed bureaucrats, “the elements in the TSK pursued a deliberate
‘strategy of tension’ to preserve their prerogatives and block the reformist
agenda of the AKP government.” It has been observed that this public
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ordinary courts. In this regard, the example of article 301 of the
new Penal Code introduced in 2005 and successively modified in
2008 is meaningful. 27 Despite a considerable decrease in

prosecutor “had good connections with the government.” Tezcür, supra note 9,
at 320.
27. The modified text of the Penal Code reads:
1. A person who publicly denigrates Turkishness, the Republic
or the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, shall be sentenced
a penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months to three
years. 2. A person who publicly denigrates the Government of
the Republic of Turkey, the judicial bodies of the State, the
military or security organizations, shall be sentenced to a
penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months to two years.
3. Where denigrating of Turkishness is committed by a
Turkish citizen in another country, the penalty to be imposed
shall be increased by one third.4. Expressions of thought
intended to criticize shall not constitute a crime.” The last
paragraph is the most relevant innovation of the reform.
According to Algan, “this statement had also been drafted to
bring to law enforcement personnel’s attention that
‘denigration’ should be demarcated from free expression.”
Seen from this angle, it was an open warning directed to the
public attorneys and to the judges.
Bülent Algan, The Brand New Version of Article 301 of Turkish Penal Code and
the Future of Freedom of Expression Cases in Turkey, 9 GER. L. REV 2081,
2241 (2008). Further on, the word “asağılamak” (to denigrate) replaces other
terms meaning “to insult” (tahkir) and “to deride” (tezyif), used in the former
version of article 159. For some authors, the old terms are more precise.
The article has been modified again in 2008 in order to bring it in line with
European standards:
Denigrating the Turkish Nation, the State of the Turkish
Republic, the Institutions and Organs of the State 1. A person
who publicly denigrates Turkish Nation, the State of the
Republic of Turkey, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey,
the Government of the Republic of Turkey or the judicial
bodies of the State, shall be sentenced a penalty of
imprisonment for a term of six months and two years. 2. A
person who publicly denigrates the military or security
structures shall be punishable according to the first paragraph.
3. Expressions of thought intended to criticize shall not
constitute a crime. 4. The prosecution under this article shall
be subject to the approval of the Minister of Justice.
The introduction of the last paragraph is explained by the will to discourage any
arbitrary use of the article by prosecutors. Id. at 2238.
In the 2005 Regular Progress Report, the European Commission stated that:
the abovementioned Article 301 cases raise serious concerns
about the capacity of certain judges and prosecutors to make
decisions in accordance with Article 10 ECHR and the
relevant case law of the ECtHR. If the code continues to be
interpreted in a restrictive manner, then it may need to be
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indictments or convictions based on this article, 28 which has been
often used “as a political weapon of the judiciary against freedom
of expression” 29 thanks to the extremely general character of its
provisions, judges and prosecutors showed a certain degree of
resistance to normative changes through making reference to other
unchanged provisions; 30 in some cases they even continued to
behave as if the provisions were unchanged. Thus, in 2006 the
General Assemblies of the Civil and Criminal Divisions of the
Supreme Court of Appeals established highly restrictive
jurisprudence on article 301. 31 This decision highlighted the
autonomy of the judiciary with respect to the legislative branch.
In conclusion, despite the breaches in their jurisprudence,
courts—and the Supreme Court in primis—hold a strongly
conservative attitude in the most sensitive political cases, and
judges and prosecutors still have broad discretionary power to limit
fundamental rights and freedoms, while often using policy
arguments in their decisions. 32

amended in order to safeguard freedom of expression in
Turkey. In this context court proceedings based on Article 301
will be closely monitored.
Turkey 2005 Progress Report, supra note 23 at 26.
28. Id. at 17.
29. Algan supra note 27, at 2240, n.17.
30. It is the case of the provisions included in art. 169 of the Penal Code,
concerning the support to illegal armed organizations, or in art. 288 on the
prohibition of influencing a fair trial. European Comm’n, Turkey 2008 Progress
Report
16,
May
11,
2008,
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/keydocuments/reports_nov_2008/turkey_progress_report_en.pdf
(Last
visited
October 24, 2011); see also European Comm’n, 2002 Regular Report on
Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession 21, Sept. 10, 2002, available at
http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/ab/uyelik/progre02.pdf (Last visited December 13,
2011); 2003 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession 30,
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2003/rr_tk_final_e
n.pdf (Last visited December 13, 2011).
31. On the basis of Article 301 of the new Penal Code, the Court confirmed
a six-month suspended prison sentence for journalist Hrant Dink for insulting
“Turkishness” in a series of articles he wrote on Armenian identity, European
Comm’n, Turkey 2006 Progress Report 14, Aug. 11 2006, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/tr_sec_1390_en.p
df (Last visited December 13, 2011).
32. As an example, in October 2005 the Council of State rendered a
decision sentencing a teacher wearing the headscarf on the way from home to
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III. JUDICIAL TRAINING
The conservative attitude of judges and prosecutors and the
peculiarity of their legal reasoning questions the characteristics of
judicial training, which plays an essential role in knowledge,
practices and behavior transmission and socialization. As the
judicial culture raises the issue of the proper implementation of the
recent Euro-driven reforms, the European Commission has
underlined the
[i]mportance [of] sustained efforts . . . with respect
to training judges [and] prosecutors,” as well as the
fact that judges and prosecutors “are reminded by
the responsible authorities about their duties and
obligations to respect the relevant provisions
stemming from International and European
conventions in the area of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, as required under Article 90
of the Turkish Constitution. 33
The Turkish judicial training system falls within the typical
continental model, hinging at the same time, at least since 1982, on

school, while the law prohibited wearing headscarf only in public places (in this
case, the school). Hootan Shambayati, Semi-Democratic/Authoritarian Regimes:
The Judicialization of Turkish (and Iranian) Politics, in RULE BY LAW: THE
POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 286, 297 (Tom Ginsburg &
Tamir Moustafa eds., Cambridge University Press, 2008).
33. Turkey 2005 Progress Report, supra note 23, at 17. In the European
Commission’s eyes, this should be even more necessary in consideration of the
corporatist character of some reform proposals raised by European Commission
experts. See European Comm’n, The Functioning of the Judicial System in the
Republic of Turkey: Report of an Advisory Visit (July 11-19, 2005) (prepared by
Paul Richmond & Kjell Björnberg). According to art. 90 of the Constitution, as
amended on May 22, 2004,
International agreements duly put into effect bear the force of
law. No appeal to the Constitutional Court shall be made with
regard to these agreements, on the grounds that they are
unconstitutional. In the case of a conflict between international
agreements in the area of fundamental rights and freedoms
duly put into effect and the domestic laws due to differences in
provisions on the same matter, the provisions of international
agreements shall prevail.
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY May 22, 2004, art. 90.
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the above-mentioned “civilizing mission” of the judiciary.
Therefore, the judicial training system resulted in a hybridism
between the French (bureaucratic) idea of the judge as a “law
technician” and the specifically Turkish tradition of the judge as
“ideology guardian.” This system, allowing internal hierarchical
and non-dialogical reproduction-transmission of knowledge and
connection with the executive, was consistent with the “top-down
attempt to enforce the ideas . . . and to inculcate the resulting
cultural values and norms, that the military regime believed should
direct state institutions as well as the individual lives of citizens.”34
At the same time, such a hierarchical training system was an
instrument to indirectly control the lower courts, because, as has
been observed, “while the military may have strong informal
influence over the high judiciary, the military’s ability to control
the behavior of the lower court judges cannot be assumed.” 35 It
seems that the even consistent changes in the Turkish judicial
training system have not radically modified this picture. This is
clear if we look at the different elements constituting the notion of
“judicial training system,” i.e. the structures making up the training
process (i) and the training contents and methods (ii).
A. Justice Academy
Before the creation in 1987 of a School for Candidate
Judges and Public Prosecutors under the control of the Minister of
Justice, the training process was essentially managed on the one
hand by the academic institutions,36 on the other by the judiciary
itself. In this framework, courts constituted the main agents of
34. “The goal was to create a Liberal Turkish state and society along a
French historical model of Liberalism.” Patricia J. Woods & Lisa Hilbink,
Comparative Sources of Judicial Empowerment: Ideas and Interests, 62 POL.
RES. Q. 745, 748 (2009).
35. Tezcür, supra note 9, at 311. It is worth noting that in France the
creation of a judicial school after the Second World War was supported by
lower judges and the Union fédérale de la magistrature (UFM), while the older
judges “optaient plutôt pour la simple reproduction sans école et, plus
globalement, les magistrats palcés en haut de la hiérarchie judiciaire, à la Cour
de cassation, en tenaient pour le statu quo.” JEAN-PIERRE ROYER, HISTOIRE DE
LA JUSTICE EN FRANCE, 876 (3d ed., Presses Universitaires de France, 2001).
36. These are under the supervision of the military through the Higher
Education Board (Yükseköğretim Kurulu, YÖK).
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socialization. The creation of the School during the liberal period
of Turgut Özal slightly weakened the internal influence, because
the training catalogues were under the control of the Education
Department of the Ministry of Justice and the School as a whole
was subordinated to the Ministry of Justice. 37 Nevertheless, judges
and prosecutors undertook two-thirds of the two-year period of
vocational training in general courts and in the Supreme Court of
Appeals (or the Council of State), which, therefore, still
determined the form of the training.
The creation of the Justice Academy in 2003—in view of
the gradual compliance of the Turkish legal system to the
European standards—did not bring about major substantial
changes, apart from opting for a multi-professional training
institution.38 On the one hand, dependence from the Ministry of
justice has been confirmed, notwithstanding the mixed
composition of the General Assembly of the Academy (which
somehow minimizes the presence of representatives of the
judiciary). 39 This entailed some criticism by the highest
37. The Functioning of the Judicial System in the Republic of Turkey:
Report of an Advisory Visit, supra note 33, at 44.
38. The Academy is also in charge of the training of administrative and
military judges, lawyers, notaries. Regarding judges and prosecutors, the initial
training path varies depending on the judicial career (ordinary, administrative,
military).
39. The President of the Justice Academy is appointed by the Ministry of
Justice from among three candidates proposed by the Board of Directors. The
Board of Directors consists of a President, the General Director for Personnel
from the Ministry of Justice and five members elected by the General Assembly.
The General Assembly is composed of 27 members, eleven of whom depend on
the executive power. Of the remainder, five are members of the judiciary, five
are academics from the universities, four are representatives of the Academy
staff and two represent the other legal professions. In addition, three members
appointed by the Ministry of Justice constitute the Board of Auditors. The
Presidency of the Centre for the Training of Candidate Judges and Public
Prosecutors, which is incorporated within the Academy once established, are
appointed by the Ministry of Justice on proposal of the President of the
Academy who, in turn, is appointed by the Ministry. See, The Functioning of the
Judicial System in the Republic of Turkey: Report of an Advisory Visit, supra
note 33, at 45. The Ministry of Justice also influences recruitment. Graduates
seeking entry to the judicial profession as either judges or prosecutors first take
a written examination administered by the School Selection and Placement
Centre, which administers all examinations for entry to higher education
institutes in Turkey. Candidates who pass the written examination are
interviewed by a panel composed of representatives of the Ministry of Justice,
and successful candidates are admitted to the Judicial Academy for two years of
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representatives of the judiciary against the law founding the
Academy, as well as by important members of the Union of
Turkish Bar Associations and of the Istanbul Bar Association. 40 On
the other hand, two-thirds of the training period continued to be
held within the courts, including the Supreme Court of Appeals. 41
Therefore, notwithstanding the existence of an institution
external to the judiciary, the current system reiterates forms of
internal hierarchical dependence and knowledge reproduction. On
the contrary, Turkey did not accept the suggestion of extending—
following the practice in the French training system—practical
experience to extrajudicial institutions, such as bar associations or
enterprises, as measures allowing the opening-up of the judiciary
towards the civil society. 42 In the same sense, the suggestion rising
from the Council of Europe to include representatives of other
legal professions and members of civil society in the teaching staff,
which is now composed mainly of academicians and members of
the higher courts, is not followed. 43 In conclusion, referring to the
Justice Academy as an autonomous institution—as the Turkish

training. The oral examination enables the Ministry of Justice to exercise
considerable influence over the recruitment of candidate judges and prosecutors.
Id. at 19.
40. Id. at 27.
41. The training period for future ordinary judges lasts two years and
includes two main phases. In the first, candidates follow a four-month
preparatory training programme within the Academy and an eight-month stage
within the so-called internship courts or prosecutor offices or ministerial
departments. The second phase is characterized by a specific training
(judge/prosecutor), also including a four-month training programme and an
eight-month stage within different courts (including the Supreme Court of
Appeals).
42. HAROLD ÉPINEUSE, ÉVALUATION DE LA FORMATION DES MAGISTRATS EN
FRANCE ET EN EUROPE. BILAN ET PERSPECTIVES 20 (Institut des hautes études
sur la justice., 2008).
43. CoE Lisbon Network, Questionnaire "A" on the structural and
functional features of training institutions of judges and prosecutors. Turkey,
available
at
www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/lisbonnetwork/questionnaires/Turkey-replyA.pdf (Last visited December 13, 2011). Furthermore, faced with the necessity
of integrating the judicial body in order to fulfill the many vacant posts, a law
allowing for practicing lawyers to become judges or prosecutors was rejected.
The many vacant posts have been filled every year through standard recruitment
procedures, The Functioning of the Judicial System in the Republic of Turkey:
Report of an Advisory Visit, supra note 33, at 58.
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Minister of Justice does 44—without taking into account the reality
of the different internal and external influences on the training
process could be misleading.
B. Training Contents and Methods
Concerning training contents and methods, three
preliminary observations have to be made pertaining to the general
situation of legal education in Turkey. The first is the lack of
satisfactory legal education within universities, which has been
highlighted by different reports as well as by judges themselves, 45
and the persistence of outdated teaching methods in initial training.
The second is that training contents and methods owe much to the
Roman law tradition, where the center of interest is not the student,
but the law, and legal education aims at presenting a coherent
system covered by general political principles which will enable
the judge to understand and apply the law. 46 This is common to
other systems, like the Italian system, where, starting with
university studies, teaching is essentially technical and theoretical
and law and politics are seen as two completely distinct areas. 47
The third is that education and training are ideologically-oriented.
Indeed, the military kept always in mind the importance of

44. See European Comm’n for the Efficiency of Justice, Scheme for
Evaluating Judicial Systems 2007 (March 9, 2008) (prepared by Mert Harun &
Turker Gökcen).
45. As the former President of the Supreme Court of Appeals stated,
one of the most important conditions of improving the quality
and reducing errors is to employ well-educated and competent
jurists who are able to make sound interpretations and correct
conclusions. Unfortunately, the ever-increasing Faculties of
Law, which are only so in name, are rapidly corrupting law
education. Unless radical measures are taken, this corruption
will increase. Professional ethics and the objectivity of judges
are only possible through quality education.
The Functioning of the Judicial System in the Republic of Turkey: Report of an
Advisory Visit, supra note 33, at 100. In 2006, there were thirty Law Faculties in
Turkey.
46. This applies also to the legal education in Law faculties. See Elliot E.
Cheatham, Legal Education in Turkey: Some Thoughts on Education for
Foreign Students, 2 J. LEGAL ED. 21, 23 (1949).
47. Shambayati, supra note 32, at 286.
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training 48 and, to mention some examples, it organized “special
briefings for judges and prosecutors in 1997 to ensure that they
shared the priorities of the TSK [the military] in its fight against
the ‘internal enemies’ (i.e. Islamic political actors),” 49 while law
school curricula included until recently a course on the history and
purposes of the revolutionary reforms in the fourth year. 50 Yet, one
could refer to the narrow notion of impartiality of judges that was
outlined on occasion of the opening ceremony of the Justice
Academy’s 2007-2008 academic year by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Appeals, for whom judges must be partial to
protect and sustain the Republic. 51
Avoiding any review of the courses held at the Justice
Academy, I would like to point out one essential facet of the
current situation, questioning if recent reforms have brought (or
have the potential to bring) any change in Turkish judicial culture.
I think the response should be twofold. It is unquestionable that the
Ministry of Justice has suitably updated training catalogues in
more sensitive areas in accordance with the convergence with
European standards. The update concerned mainly EU law and
human rights through ECHR provisions and ECtHR case law,
consisting also in specific programmes aimed at training judges
and public prosecutors as trainers. The overall impact of these
48. As highlighted by the creation in 1982 of the Higher Education Board
and the statement that “it is natural that developments pertaining to the national
education system, which is of vital importance for Turkey, are followed by the
General Staff.” Id. at 289.
49. Tezcür, supra note 9, at 308. The briefing routine procedure involved
also other component parts of the state and social structures, HAMIT
BOZARSLAN, HISTOIRE DE LA TURQUIE CONTEMPORAINE 88 (La Découverte,
2006).
50. Cheatham, supra note 46, at 22.
51. Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals stated
The main component of judgeship is impartiality. However,
you will be partial in your decisions to protect and sustain the
Republic of Turkey. If we are here today, it is because of the
rights secured by our Republic. You should, and have to,
know that the Republic form of government is the most
appropriate regime suitable for human dignity and honor. You
will be partial to claiming ownership of a democratic and
secular system and the rule of law; you will be partial to
owning our crescent and star flag, and to raising the flag even
higher. You do not have the luxury of being impartial to these
issues.
Kemal Şahin, Impartiality of the Judiciary, 1 ANKARA B. REV. 16 (2008).
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measures was deemed largely satisfactory by several lawyers’
associations, and it is also indirectly confirmed by some analysis of
the courts’ jurisprudence. Certain attention was given to judicial
ethics in relation to corruption phenomena, and foreign languages,
although some concerns have been expressed on the quality and
the extension of the relative courses. 52 Specific ongoing training
courses focused on law reforms, falling within ordinary legal
adjournment. Moreover, several judges participated in exchange
programmes, allowing the potential opening of the judicial body.
In this regard, European convergence has then given noticeable
results.
Nevertheless, there is ground for more critical remarks in
relation to other disciplinary areas. The training catalogues for the
pre-service training are essentially oriented towards traditional law
subjects and technical issues, with scarce or no attention to social
sciences and comparative law as well as on subjects and learning
methods aimed at developing a critical attitude in the judge,
allowing the introjection of a culture of independence and
pluralism and the making of what has been called a “thinking
judge,” able to participate in European constitutional discourse. 53
In a word, no attention is given to what the European Judicial
Training Network calls “Society Issues,” a catalogue including
courses such as “The judge’s role and self-image today,” “The
judge as arbiter of value,” “On the independence of the judiciary—
A European comparison,” and so on. Therefore, a better balance
should be established between strictly technical issues and societal,
constitutional and comparative subjects—more in general, what is

52. The Functioning of the Judicial System in the Republic of Turkey:
Report of an Advisory Visit, supra note 23, at 96, 101.
53. Capeta, supra note 2, at 53, for which constitutional discourse “requires
not only mechanical application of the principles learned, but also a critical
assessment of them, either in relation to the internal legal order or as part of the
European legal order.” Within the pre-service curriculum for ordinary judges
there are six training catalogues. Two training catalogues concerns respectively
“Professional Culture” and “General Culture and Personal Development;” the
first one includes essentially technical subjects, while the second, which has a
residual character, includes essentially courses related to personal abilities rather
than general culture. A further catalogue focus on “Courses and Hobbies,”
which includes, among others, courses on “Applied Turkish music,” “Folkloric
dances,” “Traditional Turkish handicrafts” and “Foreign language.”
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indicated as “complex curricula.” 54 Further on, one could question
the inclusion in Turkish training catalogues of subjects concerning
Turkish national culture and the still scarce attention to foreign
languages and other cultures.
Lastly, training methods also reflect a traditional approach,
similar to legal university education, where teaching methods are
based on “lecturer centered system-conferencing courses” of a
theoretical character, consisting mainly in memorizing legal
principles and rules. 55 Thus, not much attention is yet paid to
suggestions coming from the European Commission on the need to
integrate lectures and seminars with “methods allowing broader
dissemination of the results of training.” 56 While this problem is
more serious concerning university legal education rather than
judicial vocational training, nonetheless it still exists.
In conclusion, we can look at the French judicial training
system, which is generally used as a reference model for candidate
countries, in particular in relation to training catalogues. The
French system responds to three main objectives: acquisition of
technical competence; understanding the social and economic
milieu in which judges operate; and developing critical reflection

54. “The types of judicial education programmes that fall under “complex
curricula” include those that suggest judges explore different dimensions to their
role or explore their attitudes, values and beliefs. Judges’ learning style
preferences generally mean these types of courses are more difficult to
implement. Most judges’ learning preferences are for concise, logical analysis,
abstract ideas, technical tasks and practical solutions. In contrast, complex
curricula programmes (such as those designed to explore diversity or the social
and cultural context to litigation) often do not fit these learning preferences,”
Daniela Piana, Cheryl Thomas, Harold Epineuse, Carlo Guarnieri, Judicial
Training & Education Assessment Tool. Meeting the Changing Training Needs
of Judges in Europe, JUDICIAL STUDIES ALLIANCE 14 (2007).
55. A. Başözen, New Method in Turkish Legal Education: Internship
During
the
Law
Faculty,
available
at
http://www.eakademi.org/incele.asp?konu=New%20Method%20in%20Turkish%20Legal%2
0Education:%20Internship%20During%20the%20Law%20Faculty&kimlik=127
1314793&url=makaleler/abasozen-3.htm (Last visited November 5, 2011).
56. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and
the Council on judicial training in the European Union, COM/2006/0356 final,
section 25, where it is added: “Moreover, the introduction of a multidisciplinary
element in compliance with national traditions should facilitate exchanges of
views and experience between, for example, judges, prosecutors, lawyers and
police officers.”
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on the judicial function. 57 As I have briefly pointed out, the
improvement of the Turkish judicial training system is essentially
oriented towards the first objective.
IV. CONCLUSION
As we have seen, changes in the Turkish judicial training
system do not achieve a shift from a traditionally bureaucratic
conception of judicial education to a pluralist one, where the “law
is defined not by the letter of the law, but by its meaning,” drawing
from interaction between multiple actors. 58 European influence is
limited to the introduction of training catalogues connected with
contingent needs, such as human rights and EU law, but (still) does
not affect the institutional framework, nor does it adapt judicial
training contents and methods to social and political pluralism. 59
This situation has tangible effects on judicial culture. The
above-mentioned analysis of courts’ jurisprudence and surveys of
judicial ideology seem to confirm a certain resistance in openingup the judicial elite to social pluralism in order to allow the
judiciary to act as an interface with civil society, due to the
peculiarities of the Turkish socio-political system. The result is a
57. Questionnaire ''B'' on the role of training institutions in recruitment and
initial training of judges and prosecutors. Council of Europe, Lisbon Network,
available
at
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/lisbonnetwork/
questionnaires/France-reply-B.pdf. (Last visited October 24, 2011).
58. Sinisa Rodin, Discourse and Authority in European and PostCommunist Legal Culture, 1 CROATIAN YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN L. AND POL’Y
3 (University of Zagreb, 2005).
59. An indirect confirmation comes from the observation that Turkey is not
an active player in international networks permitting broader socialization and
the opening-up of the judiciary. B. van Delden, Effectiveness of the Judicial
System. Report of a peer based assessment mission to Turkey, November 17-21,
2008 (European Commission, 2008). This seems to confirm what has been
observed by Daniela Piana in relation to Central and Eastern European recent
accession Countries, i.e. that the adoption of any judicial training reform is
highly dependent from the national actors which are involved. D. Piana,
Unpacking Policy Transfer, Discovering Actors: The French Model of Judicial
Education Between Enlargement and Judicial Cooperation in the EU, FRENCH
POL. 5, 33-65 (2007). In fact, judicial training reforms in Turkey were
essentially conducted by the Government through its Ministry of Justice and the
High Judiciary, with scarce participation of lower court judges and judicial
association, whose constitution has been authorized only in 2006.
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judge who is still separate from society. 60 The issue has been
recently raised by Osman Can, co-chairman of the “Judges and
Prosecutors Association for Democracy and Freedom.” According
to Can, the Turkish judiciary should have a mental transformation,
which passes also through an appropriate consideration of training
needs. Thus, he suggests that “members of the judiciary should
know about comparative political history and about nondemocratic movements and their implications for the world and
also for Turkey.” 61 The lack of a comprehensive training strategy
aimed at effectively shaping independent judges through the ability
to reason, taking into account normative and extra-normative
elements, is also reflected in the type of legal argumentation used,
characterized as authoritarian rather than authoritative legal
discourse: 62 thus, courts often refer to ECHR provisions or ECtHR
case law simply as a mere support of their decision rather than as a
reasoning instrument, excluding any constructive disagreement. In
this regard, it has been observed that “Turkish courts very often
pretend to consider the case law of the European Court of Human
Rights, but then conclude that national laws and their interpretation

60. Interesting evidence is given by a columnist of the English language
newspaper Today’s Zaman:
Even for practical family matters, they [the judges] treated the
people opposite them as just a part of problem. In the case in
which I was a witness, after answering the judge’s questions, I
tried to raise some points which had not occurred to him to ask
and which were very important to the subject; however, he
silenced me. In all three cases, instead of my own sentences,
the judges asked the record keepers to write whatever they
dictated on my behalf . . . I have heard several times that when
candidates are chosen to be future judges, they are told they
should keep their distance from ordinary people. They are
asked not go to places everybody goes—they should not carry
shopping bags, and they should not bargain when they buy
apples. Of course, not only are they learning some manners,
they are taught that they are the defenders of the republic,
especially secularism.
Ayse Karabat, A Face Like a Court(room) Wall, in TODAY’S ZAMAN, Feb. 21,
2010.
61. Karabat, Taboo-Breaking Jurist Osman Can: Judiciary Cannot be
Supra Political, in TODAY’S ZAMAN, Jan. 10, 2010.
62. M. Bobek, The Fortress of Judicial Independence and the Mental
Transitions of the Central European Judiciaries, 1 EUR. PUB. L. 109 (2008).
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of the present case is in full conformity with them.” 63 That means a
rhetorical use of ECHR provisions and ECtHR case law.
The Turkish-European convergence, which I have
considered through the lens of judicial training, is then generating
changes in specific areas of legal knowledge, not in judicial
mentality. This observation confirms what has been noted by some
authors in relation to the Centre and East European former
candidate and candidate Countries, concerning the ability of judges
not only to refer in their decision to European law, but also to fully
participate in the “constitutional discourse.” For these authors,
European convergence brings about the former, but not the latter.
As a consequence, major changes in legal education are needed
and, “provided this transformation does not remain merely formal,
but also brings changes in the curricula, syllabuses and methods of
legal education, future . . . judges will be prepared to participate in
European constitutional discourse.” 64 Regarding training
structures, the path that has been sketched through the creation of
the Justice Academy consists to a certain extent of the shift from
judicial influence to the ministerial influence. Rather, a settling of
the internal balance of the judicial training system involving a
breach of the vertical/hierarchical logic, that is typical of any
bureaucratic organization, would be more suitable. This new
milieu could profit from the greater reactivity to opening-up
towards civil society of the lower courts.

63. “In plain words, Turkish Courts should bring their understanding of
freedom of expression in line with that of the European Court of Human Rights.
Otherwise, no amendment of law will contribute to the protection of that
freedom. The solution to the problem mainly depends on a change in mentality,
not in the law.” B. Algan, supra note 27, at 2250.
64. Capeta, supra note 2, at 53. The task is not at all easy, by reason of the
high number of judges and prosecutors—more than 9000—for a country of
more than 75 million of inhabitants.

